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  In June of 2016, the Supreme Court passed down a unanimous decision endorsing the 
implied false certification theory as a basis for False Claims Act (“FCA”) liability, answering a 
divisive split in the Circuits below.1  More importantly, however, the Supreme Court established 
a set of factors to guide the analysis of the materiality requirement of the FCA.2  In describing 
these factors, the Court stated:   
[A] condition of payment is relevant but not automatically dispositive. […]  Proof 
of materiality can [also] include, but is not necessarily limited to, evidence that 
the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims. […] 
If the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that 
certain requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those 
requirements are not material. Or, if the Government regularly pays a particular 
type of claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were 
violated, and has signaled no change in position, that is strong evidence that the 
requirements are not material.3  
  
While the Court did use the wording “very strong” to denote the importance of Government 
payment, ambiguity remains among the courts below with regard to how to weigh the factor of 
continued government payment.  Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Campie, coming 
out of the Ninth Circuit, would give the Supreme Court the opportunity to address the 
discrepancies in the courts below and describe more clearly how continued Government payment  
 
1 Universal Health Svcs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1996, _ U.S. _  (2016).  
2 Id.   
3 Id. at 2003-04.  
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is to be interpreted. 45     
Justice Thomas correctly articulated that the standard for the materiality determination of 
a false claim is a balancing test of a number of factors.  Continued government payment is noted 
as being very strong evidence; however, the circuits below are misusing this factor.  In several 
instances, the circuits are ignoring the circumstances surrounding the payment and therefore, 
failing to account for additional reasons why the Government might continue to pay in the face 
of a potential false claim.  The Supreme Court should articulate more clearly the weight 
attributed to Government payment, while accounting for a full inquiry into the circumstances as 
to why the Government has still paid in the face of a potential fraudulent claim.   
HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:  
In relevant part, the current text of the False Claims Act imposes liability on any person 
who knowingly presents a false statement or record to the Government that is material to a claim 
for payment5  
The Act defines “knowing” or “knowingly” as when a person has actual knowledge of 
the information, acts in “deliberate ignorance” of the truth, or acts recklessly with regard to the 
truth or falsity of the knowledge. 6  A “claim” comprises any request or demand, whether under a 
contract or otherwise, for money or property that is presented to the United States or a 
contractor.7  The statute states that a claim is “material” when it has a natural tendency to 
influence, or is capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.8     
 
4 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Jeffrey Campie, et al., Petition for Writ of Certiorari 17-936 (January 
3, 2018).  
5 U.S.C.A. § 3729.  
6 Id. at (iii)(1).  
7 Id. at (iii)(2).  




The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 during the Civil War to address concerns that 
some organizations sold supplies to the Union Army that were not as they were represented, 
thereby defrauding the Government.9  Congress amended the modern FCA in 1986 to enhance 
the Government’s ability to recover losses due to alleged fraud.10  However, the FCA was not 
created to serve as an all-purpose vehicle to prosecute “garden-variety” frauds, but instead,  
severe frauds perpetrated against the Government.11  
Congress amended the FCA again in 2009 as part of the Fraud Enforcement and  
Recovery Act (FERA) to resolve ambiguities surrounding the materiality element.12   
Specifically, in FERA, Congress imposed liability on one who “knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”13  
Previously absent from the statute, the addition of the word “material” did not create a new 
materiality standard, but instead, “merely made explicit and consistent that which had previously 
been a judicially-imposed, and oftentimes conflicting, standard.”14  As the First Circuit noted in 
U.S. ex rel. Loughren v. Unum Group, “under both versions, [Relator] was required to prove 
falsity, materiality, and scienter.”  Therefore, the requirements were unchanged, however after 
2009; it was explicit from the statute that this was the method of inquiry under the FCA.15  The 
real issue with the FCA prior to 2009 was not that the materiality requirement was absent, but 
rather, that without an express definition, the circuits had to guess at its meaning.16    
 
9 Escobar, 136 S.Ct at 1998.  
10 Todd B. Castleton, Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator Information Under the False Claims Act 
and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 GEO. MASON L. Rev., 327, 340 (1996).  
11 Escobar, 136 S.Ct at 1998.  
12 Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.).  
13 United States ex rel. Spay v. CVS Caremark Corp., 875 F.3d 746, 761 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).  
14 Id.  
15 Loughren, 613 F.3d at 316 n.7.  
16 Spay, 875 F.3d at 762.  
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  Prior to FERA, the two controlling fraud cases passed down by the Supreme Court were 
United States v. Wells and Neder v. United States.  In 1997 the Court in Wells held that, when it 
came to knowingly making false statements to federally insured banks, after a “natural reading 
of the full text,” materiality was not explicitly written, and thus not an element of a claim.17   
Two years later, the Court in Neder held that it was not incorrect when it concluded in Wells that 
materiality was not a written element of many fraud statutes, however, when the statute included 
the wording “fraud” as opposed to “false statement,” it was correct to impose a common law 
materiality requirement to that fraud.18  The synthesis of these two cases led to the general 
finding that statutes using the word “false”, if lacking an express materiality requirement, 
presumptively did not have such a standard.  While statutes using the word “fraud” were 
interpreted to include a materiality requirement, unless the clear language of the statute said 
otherwise.19  Prior to FERA, no iteration of the False Claims Act ever included the word 
materiality.20 Therefore, using the Wells/Neder framework, the “natural reading of the text” did 
not include materiality as an element.  Further, the FCA used neither the words “false statement” 
nor “fraud,” but instead, “false claim.”  This led many courts below to struggle with the 
Wells/Neder framework when determining whether the FCA included an “inherent common-law 
materiality” or instead no “presumption of materiality.”  This illustrates the importance of 
Congress’ enacting FERA in 2009, in order to offer clarity on the materiality divide.21  
PRE-ESCOBAR:  
 
17 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 483 (1997)(citation omitted).  
18 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22-23(1999).  
19 See Wells, 519 U.S. at 483; see also, Neder, 527 at 23-25.  
20 See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863); U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 36 §§ 3490-3494 (1865); Id. §§ 34903494 
(1875); 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235 (1926); Id. §§ 231-235 (1935); Id. §§ 231-235 (1943); Id. §§ 3729-3731 (1982); Id. 
§§ 3729-3733(1986); Id. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).  




  Much like the pre-FERA materiality ambiguities caused a rift among the circuits in their  
FCA enforcement, so did the theory of “implied false certification.”  This theory holds that, 
“when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly certifies compliance with all conditions of 
payment. But if that claim fails to disclose the defendant's violation of a material statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement, so the theory goes, the defendant has made a 
misrepresentation that renders the claim false or fraudulent under § 3729(a)(1)(A).”22  
Specifically, Universal Health Svcs. Inc., v. United States ex rel. Escobar rejected the holding 
from the Seventh Circuit in Sanford-Brown that expressly rejected the implied certification 
theory.23    
Historically, liability under the FCA arose from allegations that claims were factually 
false, or one of two theories of false certification: express false certification, or implied false 
certification.  The implied certification theory is a judicially created theory first addressed in  
Ab–Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States, in 1994.2425  An important decision by The Second  
Circuit in Mikes v Straus rejected the implied certification theory.26  More importantly however, 
it articulated the growing confusion over the materiality standard in the FCA.27  The Second 
Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits in finding that a claim is legally false 
 
22 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1994.  
23 Id. at 1989, see also United States v. Sanford-Brown, 788 F.3d 696, 711-12 (7th Cir. 2015)    
24 Ab–Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 429 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir.1995) 
(unpublished table decision); See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729.  
25 In Ab-Tech, The Court of Federal Claims held that the defendants' submission of payment vouchers, although 
containing no express representation as to what, implicitly certified their adherence to the requirements of a federal 
small business program. The defendants’ failure to adhere to rules did not directly preclude payment, but submitting 
a claim while knowingly not being in compliance with said rules nonetheless constituted a false statement in 
connection to a claim for payment, resulting in False Claims Act liability.    
26 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).  
27 Id.  
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only where a party certifies compliance with a statutory condition to payment.28  In reference to 
materiality under the FCA, the court stated in dicta that:  
“[…] although materiality is a related concept, our holding is distinct from a 
requirement imposed by some courts that a false statement or claim must be 
material to the government's funding decision. A materiality requirement holds 
that only a subset of admittedly false claims is subject to False Claims Act 
liability. We rule simply that not all instances of regulatory noncompliance will 
cause a claim to become false. We need not and do not address whether the Act 
contains a separate materiality requirement.29  
  
Although not a holding of the case, this statement echoed nationwide confusion on when, and if, 
the materiality requirement applied in all FCA claims.  A statement that the Supreme Court took 
the opportunity to answer in Escobar.    
UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC. V. U.S. (ESCOBAR):  
  While addressing the viability of the implied certification theory for an FCA claim, the 
Supreme Court in January of 2016, articulated a decisive standard with regard to the function of 
the materiality requirement in a false claims inquiry, answering a divisive split in the Circuits 
below.30  Justice Thomas articulated a set of factors to use for a balancing test when determining 
the materiality of a false claim.    
  In Escobar, a young girl’s parents brought a qui tam suit under the False Claims Act after 
their daughter died of a seizure following treatment at a Universal Health Services mental health 
clinic by several unlicensed and unsupervised doctors and aides in violation of Medicaid 
regulations.31  She received counseling services for approximately five years, and after being 
 
28 Id. at 697 (citing United States ex rel. Siewick v. Jamieson Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 214 F.3d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 
2000); United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997); 
United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266–67 (9th Cir. 1996); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah 
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 (4th Cir. 1999)).  
29 Id. at 697 (citing Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785; United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 
415 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 880 (2000))(internal citations omitted).   
30 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1996.   




diagnosed with bipolar disorder, a “doctor” at the facility prescribed her medication for her 
disease.32  Rivera's condition declined until she died of a seizure caused by an adverse reaction to 
the medication.33  It was later revealed that few of the Arbour employees were actually licensed 
to administer mental health counseling or authorized to prescribe medication.34 The “doctor” 
who diagnosed Yarushka as bipolar represented herself as a psychologist with a Ph.D. to the 
Escobars, but did not mention that her degree came from an unaccredited Internet college and 
that Massachusetts had denied her application to be a licensed psychologist.35 The practitioner 
who prescribed medicine to Yarushka was actually a nurse who lacked authority to prescribe 
medications without doctor supervision.35    
  The Escobars brought the claim in the District Court of Massachusetts alleging that 
Universal Health defrauded the Medicaid program by seeking reimbursement for services 
rendered by professionals without disclosing that these professionals were unlicensed.36  The  
District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that there is no liability when 
the licensing requirements were not a “condition of payment.”38  The Escobars then appealed to 
the First Circuit, which reversed in relevant part and remanded, holding that every claim 
impliedly represents that the facility had complied with the required regulations, so an 
undisclosed violation makes the claim false.37  The First Circuit held that those regulations were 
a material condition of payment.38    
 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1989. 
35 Id. at 1997.  
35 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1997.  
36 United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Serv., 2014 WL 1271757 (D. Mass. Mar. 26, 2014).   38 
Id.  
37 United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Serv., 780 F.3d 504, 517 (1st Cir. 2015).  
38 Id.  
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  The Supreme Court attempted to clarify the confusion among the Circuits about the test 
for determining materiality under the False Claims Act by stating:   
False Claims Act liability for failing to disclose violations of legal requirements 
does not turn on whether those requirements were expressly designated as 
conditions of payment [....] [w]hat matters is not the label the Government 
attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a 
requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment 
decision.39  
  
The Court noted, “liability does not depend on whether the regulatory or contractual 
requirements were expressly designated as a condition for payment.”40  The deciding factor is 
whether the misrepresentation was material to the payment decision.41  In evaluating materiality 
for purposes of the FCA, express identification of a condition of payment is not “automatically 
dispositive” although it is relevant.42  It is, “whether the defendant knowingly violated a 
requirement known to be material to the payment decision.”43  The Court described the 
materiality standard as “rigorous” and “demanding” noting that it is insufficient that the 
Government merely would have had the option to decline payment with knowledge of 
noncompliance.44 Ultimately, “what matters is not the label the Government attaches to a 
requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant 
knew [was] material to the payment decision.”45  
  Justice Thomas quoted the Neder Court in explicating the concept of materiality, “[T]he 
term ‘material’ means having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the 
 
39 Id. at 1996.  
40 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1994.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 2003.  




payment or receipt of money or property.”46  Moreover, the Court held, “under any 
understanding of the concept, materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of 
the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.”’47  However, the Court was clear that the FCA 
materiality standard was not as easy to satisfy as its common-law equivalent.48  Holding 
specifically, “[t]he materiality standard is demanding. The False Claims Act is not an all-purpose 
antifraud statute, or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or regulatory 
violations.”49  The Court emphasized that the FCA is a vehicle for only for claims of serious 
fraud, unlike its common-law ancestors.50  Once the Court was clear on the nature of the 
standard, the Court then articulated “factors” that are relevant when reviewing a claim for 
materiality.51    
  The Court rejected reliance on an express statement that a requirement is a condition of 
payment by stating, “[a] misrepresentation cannot be deemed material merely because the 
Government designates compliance with a particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirement as a condition of payment.”52  A Government decision to put a provision in a statute 
or Government contract is relevant to the inquiry, but not the end of the inquiry.53    
Justice Thomas then articulated his materiality standard as:   
[P]roof of materiality can include, but is not necessarily limited to, evidence that 
the defendant knows that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the 
mine run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory, 
or contractual requirement. Conversely, if the Government pays a particular claim 
in full despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, that is 
 
46 Id. at 2002.  
47 Id. (citing 26 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003) (Williston)).  
48 Id. at 2003.  
49 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 2003)(citing Allison Engine Co., Inc., v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 
(2008))(internal quotation omitted).  
50 Id.  
51 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 2003.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
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very strong evidence that those requirements are not material. Or, if the 
Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual 
knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change in 
position, that is strong evidence that the requirements are not material.54  
  
Although the Court did designate certain factors as “strong evidence” or “very strong evidence,” 
the ultimate holding was that these were simply factors, none of which was strong enough to be 
dispositive by itself.55  Justice Thomas never claimed that this list was exhaustive, highlighting 
the point that the Escobar materiality standard is a nuanced one that requires the courts below to 
engage in an evaluation of the full breadth of the circumstances to determine if the alleged false 
claim was material to the Government’s decision.  The Court held that the materiality standard 
under the FCA still looked to the natural tendency and likely or actual effect a false claim would 
have on the Government’s decision to pay the claim, which is a highly fact-sensitive  
determination.56   
In addition to concluding what materiality was, Justice was also clear that materiality 
should not rest solely on the fact that the Government deems something a condition of payment, 
or that the Government would have the option to decline payment should it find out about a 
violated condition.  Contrary to what the First Circuit held, the Supreme Court said although 
these factors are relevant to the materiality inquiry, those factors are not the end of the inquiry.59   
The Supreme Court’s primary objective in articulating the new materiality standard was to 
directly overturn the First Circuit and moderate what is an “extraordinarily expansive view of 
materiality.”57   The Court sought to disallow situations where noncompliance is minor or 
 
54 Id. at 2003-4.  
55 See Id.  
56 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 2003 
59 Id.  




insubstantial, otherwise noncompliance would always be material, and a violation of a condition 
of payment would always trigger FCA liability.58    
Despite the Supreme Court’s clear admonition to the contrary, the Circuits below have 
misused the factors elicited by Justice Thomas by over-emphasizing continued government 
payment without considering the breadth of the circumstances.  Campie presents the perfect 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify that, although continued government payment is a 
factor, the courts below cannot ignore the circumstances surrounding that continued payment.  
This test was intended to be a nuanced balancing test, using the whole picture of the facts, 
therefore, it is improper to rely on one factor without reference to the others.    
POST-ESCOBAR SPLIT:  
  The circuit courts are divided in their analysis of materiality on what sort of weight 
should be applied to continued Government payment when it knows that the claimant violated 
some law or regulation, about which the vendor may or may not have made a representation in 
connection with the claim for payment, and which may or may not be relevant to the services or 
product provided to the Government. 59  The majority of the circuits hold that when the 
Government continues to pay, despite the fact that it has knowledge a vendor violated some law 
while certifying compliance with all laws, in regard to its claim for payment, that usually ends 
the inquiry.  However, recently, circuits have begun to hold in the alternative, finding that not 
every instance of continued Government payment is decisive evidence of materiality, which 
 
58 Id.  
59 See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. § 7103(c)(1) (This section does not authorize an agency head to settle, compromise, pay, or 
otherwise adjust any claim involving fraud.); 48 C.F.R. § 33.210(b) (The authority to decide or resolve claims does 
not extend to… The settlement, compromise, payment or adjustment of any claim involving fraud.); Medicare 
Program Integrity Manual § 3.7.3.3 (2017), available at http://go.cms.gov/2iUyMKx (If it is believed that the 
overpayment resulted from potential fraud, a refund may not be requested from the provider until the potential fraud 
issue is resolved.).  
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supports the correct balancing standard articulated by Justice Thomas that accounts for the entire 
circumstance of the alleged false claim.60  
  This issue is very common in the context of fraudulent inducement, where the provider 
either misleads or omits relevant information in order to secure Government payment.  
Omissions are relevant when the vendor certifies or implies compliance with standards, despite 
the fact the vendor is no longer in compliance with said standards.  Therefore, although the 
vendor is not affirmatively making misrepresentations, the failure to include that the vender is no 
longer in compliance with requirements could lead to false claim liability.  In sum, if a 
misrepresentation or an omission has the natural tendency to influence the Government’s 
decision to pay then that that false claim is material.  
Frequently these cases involve products approved by the Food & Drug Administration  
(the “FDA”).  The FDA does not make payments, however the Agency approves drugs or 
devices, for which the Government will then reimburse through various programs for which 
FDA approval is a condition precedent.  Therefore, if there is an initial fraudulent inducement 
against the FDA to get the drug or device approved, then there are practical obstacles that restrict 
the ability of the Government to stop payment.  
  One of leading the cases regarding misrepresentations in the context of FDA approval is 
D’Agostino v. ev3, Inc.61  The relator alleged that ev3 made three different fraudulent 
representations to the FDA in order to secure FDA approval of ev3’s Onyx device.65  The  
Defendants allegedly disclaimed certain uses for the device, overstated training it provided for  
 
60 United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Campie v. 
Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017).     
61 D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.  2016). 65 
Id. at 7.  
K. Madley Healthcare Fraud Paper  
 Id. 
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the device, and omitted safety information that was vital to the function of the device.62  The 
First Circuit struggled with the fact that CMS reimbursed the surgeons that used the device and 
not the FDA themselves; therefore, the court was searching for a causal link between the claims 
to the FDA and the CMS payments.63  The court was unreceptive to the argument that FDA 
approval was a pre-condition for CMS payment stating that, “alleging that fraudulent 
representations could have influenced the FDA to approve Onyx falls short of pleading a causal 
link between the representations made to the FDA and the payments made by CMS. If the 
representations did not actually cause the FDA to grant approval it otherwise would not have 
granted, CMS would still have paid the claims.”64  In response, Plaintiff argued that, “as long as  
[Defendant’s] representations at issue could have influenced the FDA to grant approval, then that 
would be material.”65  Once again, the court dismissed the argument stating that the fraudulent 
representation must be material to the Government’s payment decision itself.66  The court 
bolstered this conclusion by observing that CMS continued to pay for the device, even after 
learning of relator’s claims, thereby undermining the suggestion that the misrepresentations were 
material to CMS’ reimbursement decision.67  Explaining its holding, the court stated, “[t]o rule 
otherwise would be to turn the FCA into a tool with which a jury of six people could 
retroactively eliminate the FDA approval and effectively require that a product largely be 
withdrawn from the market even when the FDA sees no reason to do so.”72  In the wake of 
 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 D’Agostino, 845 F.3d at 7.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
K. Madley Healthcare Fraud Paper  
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D’Agostino, many courts have used this quote to dismiss claims pleading materiality in the face 
of continued Government payment.    
72    
  One such case is United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Industries, Inc., from the Fifth 
Circuit.68  Plaintiff brought an action against a rival manufacturer of highway guardrails claiming 
that the defendant misrepresented conformance with federal regulations.74 The federal 
government subsidizes the cost of highway construction and improvements through grants given 
to the states.69  During the periods relevant to the facts of the Harman case, acceptance by the 
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) of the products used in the state highway 
improvements was a prerequisite to eligibility for reimbursement.70  The plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant failed to disclose revisions in the guardrail design in a report to the FHWA.71 
Plaintiff alleged that this design revision was a defect that led to several highway deaths.72  After 
significant back-and-forth between defendant and the FHWA, including extensive testing, it was 
found that, despite the failure to disclose the change, the guardrail complied with regulations and 
thus the Government continued making guardrail cost reimbursements to states.73    
 
68 United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 661 n. 61 (5th Cir. 2017). 
74 Id. at 648.  
69 Id. at 648.  
70 Id.   
71 Id.  
72 Harman, 872 F.3d at 648.  
73 Id. at 648-49.  
K. Madley Healthcare Fraud Paper  
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  Even though the court had relatively stark facts to show the defect was not material, the 
court remained true to the nuanced materiality-balancing test.74 The court stated, “the FCA 
requires proof only that the defendant's false statements ‘could have’ influenced the  
Government's pay decision or had the ‘potential’ to influence the Government's decision, not that 
the false statements actually did so [...].”75  The court turned to its sister circuits, identifying the 
decisions from the First, Seventh, Ninth, D.C, and Third Circuits76  all holding that continued 
government payment is enough to dismiss the FCA allegation.83  Eventually opining that, “[t]he 
lesson we draw from these well-considered opinions is that, though not dispositive, continued 
payment by the federal government after it learns of the alleged fraud substantially increases the 
burden on the relator in establishing materiality.”84  Of note however, is the fact that the Harman 
court, unlike many of its sister courts, recognized the “gravity” and “clarity” of governmental 
decisions, in certain payment decisions.85  In reference to their own facts though, the court was 
bound by the fact that this particular decision “risked the lives on our nation’s highways, not just 
undue expense.”86   
  Even in the face of such an important Government decision, risking life and limb, the  
Harman court still iterated that, “there are and must be boundaries to government tolerance of a 
supplier's failure to abide by its rules.”87  The Defendant still argued that when the Government 
learns of alleged false claims, investigates said claims, and still formally approves the product, 
there is no materiality argument.88  Plaintiff countered with the argument that “post-revelation 
 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 661.  
76 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 2017) is one of the main cases 
interpreting the post-Escobar materiality standards.  In Petratos, the court relied heavily on the fact that plaintiff  
K. Madley Healthcare Fraud Paper  
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actions” by the Government are not determinative in an FCA action, and that the materiality test 
is “holistic” and no single element is dispositive.89  Handcuffed by the deliberate inaction of the  
Government, in light of years of FHWA approval, the court had to decide on behalf of  
                                                      
failed to show any set of facts to establish, and effectively conceded that, the drug makers deficiency was not 
material because the Government had full knowledge of the violation, yet still paid in full and the FDA certified 3 
subsequent drugs from Defendant Genetech.  Therefore, if the Government had full knowledge of the violation, the 
court refused to substitute its decision for that of the Government and could not find materiality.  
83 Harman, 872 F.3d at 661 (citing D’Agostino, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017); Sanford-Brown, 840 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 
2016); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. McBride v. 
Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.  2017); United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 
490 (3d Cir. 2017).  
84 Id. at 663.  
85 Harman, 872 F.3d at 663.  
86 Id.   
87 Harman, 872 F.3d at 664.  
88 Id.  
89   
Defendant, finding a lack of materiality.77  However, the court was receptive to the fact that 
under different facts, wherein the FHWA acted unaware of the facts of the fraud, the decision to 
continue payment could be undermined.78  
  The case that gave the Fifth Circuit pause in Harman was United States ex rel. Campie v. 
Gilead Scis., Inc., from the Ninth Circuit.79  Relators, two former Gilead employees, filed a qui 
tam suit against their former employer alleging it violated the False Claims Act by making false 
statements about its compliance with Food and Drug Administration regulations regarding the 
manufacture of certain HIV drugs, resulting in the receipt of billions of dollars from the 
Government.80  In order to get a drug approved for manufacture and sale in the United States, a 
 
77 Id. at 665.  
78 Id.   
79 Id. at 664, 668.  
80 Campie, 862 F.3d at 895.  
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manufacturer must submit a “new drug application” to the FDA, in which it states the chemical 
composition of a drug and specifies the facilities where it will be made, as well as “methods and 
controls” used in the manufacturing process.81 Acceptable facilities must meet federal standards, 
known as “good manufacturing practices.”82 The FDA may refuse an application or withdraw a 
previously approved application if the methods or facilities “are inadequate to preserve [the 
drug's] identity, strength, quality, and purity.”83  For consideration under the Act, the facility 
must be “acceptable”, meaning it must meet certain federal standards, known as “good 
manufacturing practices.”84  The FDA may refuse an application or withdraw an approved 
application if the methods or facilities “are inadequate to preserve [the drug's] identity, strength, 
quality, and purity.”85  Finally, once approved, the drug maker must seek FDA approval to make 
any “major changes” to the process for the making of the drug before distributing it.86  All of 
these requirements entail certification in order to receive and maintain FDA approval.87    
  In the mid-2000,’s Gilead submitted new drug applications and received FDA approval 
for three HIV drugs.88  In these drug applications, Gilead certified that the active ingredient in 
the drugs came from “specific registered factories” located in Canada, Germany, United States, 
and South Korea.89  Relators alleged that as early as 2006, Gilead contracted with Synthetics  
 
81 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1)).  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.   
85 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), (e)).  
86 Campie, 862 F.3d at 895.   
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 896.  
K. Madley Healthcare Fraud Paper  
  18  
China to make unapproved FTC at unregistered facilities, and masked this fact by bringing the 
FTC into the United States through its Canadian and South Korean factories.90 Gilead ultimately 
successfully sought approval from the FDA to use Synthetics China's FTC in October 2008, but 
according to relators, Gilead had been including products from Synthetics China in its finished 
drug products for at least two years before obtaining approval in 2010.91  More importantly, 
relators also alleged that Gilead falsified or concealed data in support of its application to get 
Synthetics China approved by the FDA.92 Relators contend that one specific representation 
regarding drug testing was false, as two of three batches had failed internal testing.106  Further, 
Gilead never acknowledged or notified the FDA about the bad test results or the contamination 
issues.107  Ultimately, the three claims asserted by relators were that; (1) Gilead actively 
concealed its use of illicit FTC products by bringing it in through its registered Canada factory  
107   
and changing the labels; (2) augmenting paperwork in order to conceal the source of the FTC; 
and (3) crediting its approved factories with the product from Synthetics China.93   
 
90 Id.  
91 Campie, 862 F.3d at 896.  
92 Campie, 862 F.3d at 896. 106 
Id. at 896.  
93 Id. at 897.  
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  In this instance, the Ninth Circuit determined that FDA approval was the “sine qua non” 
of federal funding; if the FDA approved the drug then Medicaid would reimburse it.94  Further, 
contrary to D’Agostino, the Campie court emphasized that the FDA and CMS were part of a 
single agency, Health and Human Services (“HHS”).110 The court noted the fact that the 
Government was still paying for the drugs created an uphill battle for proving materiality, 
however, the court was receptive to practical arguments.111  Specifically, the court stated when 
fraudulent FDA approval deceives HHS:  
[T]o read too much into the FDA's continued approval—and its effect on the 
government's payment decision—would be a mistake. First, to do so would allow 
Gilead to use the allegedly fraudulently-obtained FDA approval as a shield 
against liability for fraud. Second, as argued by Gilead itself, there are many 
reasons the FDA may choose not to withdraw a drug approval, unrelated to the 
concern that the government paid out billions of dollars for nonconforming and 
adulterated drugs. Third, unlike Kelly, where the government continued to accept 
noncompliant vouchers, Gilead ultimately stopped using FTC from Synthetics 
China. Once the unapproved and contaminated drugs were no longer being used, 
the government's decision to keep paying for compliant drugs does not have the 
same significance as if the government continued to pay despite continued 
noncompliance.95  
  
The court stated that these very issues are “matters of proof,” and therefore it would be 
inappropriate to dismiss the claim using 12(b)(6), addressing a stated concern in D’Agostino 
regarding the nature of “proofs” needed to clarify an FDA approval decision.96  This case is  
 
94 Id. at 905 (citing U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1176 (9th Cir. 2006). 
110 Campie, 862 F.3d at 905 111 Id. at 906.  
95 Id. at 906 (internal citation omitted).  
96 Campie, 862 F.3d at 906.   
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currently pending a Writ of Certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to address what significance 
continued Government payment should have.9798  
ARGUMENT FOR SUPREME COURT ACCEPTANCE OF THE WRIT FOR CAMPIE:  
  Campie presents the exact circumstances where, although the Government did continue 
to pay in light of potential false claims, there are other reasons for the decision, sufficient to 
survive a 12(b)(6) motion.  Unlike many of its sister circuits, the Ninth Circuit correctly viewed 
continued government payment as but a factor of a larger balancing test.  The majority of circuits 
have been less receptive to the other factors and have put an over-emphasis on continued 
government payment.  There is an ambiguity below as to when, and if, continued Government 
payment is rebuttable.  The majority of circuits seem to say that this rebuttal is near impossible, 
however practically this is not true, as articulated by Campie, Miller, and Harman.      
When describing the factors in Escobar Justice Thomas stated that, “Continued payment 
or acceptance by the Government of the fraudulent claim is very strong evidence against 
materiality.”99  Many of the circuits below that dismiss almost all claims where the Government 
continues to pay are misusing this quote.100  Many of these Circuits, like the Third Circuit in  
 
97 Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Jeffrey Campie, et al., Petition for Writ of Certiorari 17-936 
(January 3, 2018).    
98 The final main case in the series of post-Escobar materiality cases is United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., 
Inc., 840 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2016).  Like Sanford-Brown, cited above, Miller involved false certification of school 
records in violation of the Higher Education Act.  In Miller, the court placed significant weight on a pre-condition of 
payment because this specific condition certified in three separate ways, therefore overcoming the fact that the 
Government continued to pay the school.  If the Government were to rely on these falsely certified records then 
there would be no reason for them not to pay claims by the school.  The court found it important that this condition 
was so heavily bargained for, stressing the importance of the school’s honest record keeping, with regard to the 
Government’s payments.    
99 Escobar, 136 S.Ct. at 1995.   
100 D’Agostino, 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017); Sanford-Brown, 840 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2016); United States ex rel. Kelly 
v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027 (D.C.  
Cir.  2017); United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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Petratos, have had facts that make the continued payment a relatively clear statement of 
immateriality.  However, there are circumstances where courts should be more receptive to 
practical and public policy limitations for the Government to stop payment.   
For example, in United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., the Ninth Circuit grappled with 
materiality again.101  However, in that case the court relied heavily on Justice Thomas’s “option 
to not pay” wording about possible violations, while at the same time dismissing the fact that the  
Government relied on Defendant’s reports to make its payment decisions.102  Therefore, if the 
reports omitted certain details or misrepresented facts, the Government would be rely on those 
reports and make payments above and beyond what was actually required.103  This is not the type 
of fact that Justice Thomas envisioned discarding so easily when he established his materiality 
requirement. The Ninth Circuit essentially considered the Government’s reliance on said reports 
as irrelevant, in direct contrast with how Thomas instructed courts to view payment options.104  
Perhaps the court still might have decided in the same manner, but still the Government’s 
reliance on the reports is relevant, as per Justice Thomas’s instructions.  
The Supreme Court could cite Miller as a way of showing how government reliance on 
contractual provisions functions in a manner that respects the relevancy of all of Justice 
Thomas’s factors.  In Miller, while it was true that the Government did continue to pay 
defendant’s claims, it was relevant that the Government relied heavily on the academic reports 
the school was required to submit as a pre-condition of payment.105  Keenly aware of the 
importance of these reports, the court was vigilant to include them in the analysis, keeping in 
 
101 Kelly, 846 F.3d at 334.  
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Miller, 840 F.3d at 504.   
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mind that Justice Thomas said these types of pre-conditions, while not dispositive, were still 
relevant.106  The court in Miller exercised the proper type of balancing Justice Thomas 
envisioned.107  If the court were to have over-emphasized continued government payment, the 
court would have missed a key factor of materiality in this case, highlighting the importance of  
Justice Thomas’s holistic test.    
D’Agostino presents another case in which a lower court misused the Escobar materiality 
test.  This is problematic because D’Agostino is one of the most highly cited cases when it comes 
to interpreting the Escobar standard.  The First Circuit failed to recognize that the FDA and CMS 
are actually one agency of the Government.108  Therefore, a fraud on the FDA is not independent 
from the Government’s decision as the FDA and CMS function as one, HHS, in making payment 
decisions.  From the outset, the First Circuit’s interpretation is flawed.  However, what is more 
egregious is the fact that the court was highly dismissive of the fact that by defrauding the FDA 
into granting approval, the defendant effectively guaranteed payment by the Government.126  If 
the FDA approves the drug then CMS will pay for it.  It is not within  
CMS’s purview to investigate drugs if the FDA has approved them.  Therefore, until the FDA 
pulls approval the Government will continue to pay.  This set of facts highlights the importance 
of Justice Thomas’s factors, as a whole, deciding materiality, not just continued government 
payment alone.  One factor cannot tell the whole story of materiality; therefore, it is vital that the 
Supreme Court accept the writ in Campie, and reinforce the premise that no one factor is 
 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 D’Agostino, 845 F.3d at 7 126 
Id.  
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dispositive, or else the courts below will continue to over-emphasize continued government 
payment.     
 In Campie, the court acknowledged the fact that the FDA may have many different 
reasons for pulling, or not pulling a drug’s approval, and until that time comes, the Government 
will have a hard time denying payment for a drug that is FDA approved.109  The drugs made by 
Gilead were vital drugs for the treatment of HIV.110  There is a significant community of 
individuals afflicted with HIV, on Medicaid or Medicare, reliant on these drugs.  Gilead provided 
the only three makes of this particular HIV drug, so with its drug off the CMS list, the patients 
had no alternatives.  If the FDA approves a drug, and it is medically necessary with no adequate 
alternative, then CMS will automatically pay for that drug, until the FDA either pulls the 
approval or approves a new, cheaper alternative.  As stated in Campie, the FDA approval is the 
sine qua non of receipt of state funding.129  Therefore, if while the FDA investigated these 
potential fraudulent misrepresentations, the Government pulled reimbursement of these drugs, 
then a large population of very sick individuals might be without vital medication until the 
potential false claim is resolved.    
If the Supreme Court were to allow the lower courts to misuse Justice Thomas’s test and 
over-emphasize government payment then it would force agencies, like CMS, to change their 
reimbursement procedures.  In order to maintain an FCA claim, CMS would need to start pulling 
funding when the FDA gains knowledge of a potential false claim.  Otherwise, if the  
Government continues to pay, as it currently does, while the FDA is investigating, defendant’s 
will always have a claim that the Government’s continued payment while it had knowledge of a 
 
109 Campie, 862 F.3d at 905.  
110 Id. at 896. 129 
Id. at 905.  
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potential violation shows the violation was not material.  This would be a problematic procedure 
for any government agency to abide by, especially CMS where it involves the health of our 
nation.  In the event that the FDA finds the fraud to be negligible, all that irreparable harm upon 
those patients was for naught.  Perhaps Justice Thomas contemplated this scenario when creating 
his balancing test, but in any event, the Justice’s balancing test is still that; a balancing test.  The 
courts below, in decisions like D’Agostino and Kelly, are acting in direct contravention of the  
Supreme Court’s directive and are thus, promulgating poor case law.     
Second, In Campie, Gilead was able to use the FDA approval as a shield against the 
materiality argument, in that the FDA approval was the starting point for Government payment.  
The strict materiality standard, in that instance, allowed Gilead to promulgate a fraud on the FDA 
to secure approval, and then in turn receive funding from HHS based on that initial fraud on the 
FDA, while avoiding a materiality argument.111  This is inapposite to the purpose of the 
materiality standard of the FCA as iterated in Escobar.  Especially in light of the fact that, once 
the FDA began investigating Gilead, it ceased using Synthetics China, and thus came into 
conformance with the FDA’s initial approval.  To allow Gilead to escape in this instance, 
essentially allows companies to commit a fraud until caught, then simply come into compliance, 
and use the continued payment after their re-conformance as a sword against materiality. Gilead 
was content to continue its fraudulent activity, until the FDA finally realized that something with 
the drugs manufacturing process was amiss.  While it is true that Gilead ultimately came into 
conformance with regulations, the fraud promulgated upon the FDA initially should not be 
ignored simply because Gilead changed their misdoings.   
 
111 Id. at 899.  
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The Supreme Court can also use the holding from the First Circuit in Escobar, to 
reinforce how their balancing test works when it comes to misrepresentations in general, outside 
of the FDA context.112  While it is true that the Government continued to reimburse Universal 
Health Services, the Government only did so because of the misrepresentations made by the 
workers at the facility.113  Had it not been for those misrepresentations the Government would 
not have paid.114  Further, the Government relied on the billing report as being accurate and in 
compliance with the standards proscribed by the program and thus continued to pay the 
claims.115  The First Circuit faithfully used the factors as just that, factors, all weighed in 
reference in to the whole of the circumstance, not simply just looking at continued government 
payment.   
The above argument shows why this is a standard, in some circumstances, best left for 
decision at a later stage than at a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  To answer this question, it is vital 
to prove what “actual knowledge” the Government had.116  This position receives support from 
the premise that many times the communication between the Government and its Agencies 
responsible for regulation in various industries is not always efficient.  It might take some time 
for the Government to become aware of an FDA, or another agency’s investigation, and then 
even more time for them to decide, and actually have the ability to pull funding.  There are 
several steps of proofs in order to say definitively the Government had “actual knowledge” 
necessary to decide if a violation is material or not.    
 
112 United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2016).  
113 Id. at 110.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Campie, 862 F.3d at 905-6.  
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  The Court can use a combination of Campie, Harman, and Miller to provide clarity for 
the courts below when it interprets cases involving continued government payment.  The 
Supreme Court can use Campie to explain how the circumstances behind continued government 
payment might say more as to why the Government continued to pay.  Campie, D’Agostino, and  
Petratos all showed that if there were a misrepresentation made to the FDA to secure approval 
fraudulently then CMS would pay for that drug automatically.  The Supreme Court will need to 
address the issue in Circuits’ interpretations that allows defendants to plead a lack of materiality 
because CMS continued to pay while the FDA was investigating whether it should pull a drug’s 
approval.  Practically, it would be very problematic for CMS to pull funding at the beginning of 
every investigation by the FDA.  The Supreme Court could relate a spectrum of facts ranging 
from Petratos to Campie, the former leading to a finding of no materiality and the latter a finding 
of materiality.  In Petratos, the FDA investigated the drug and found the misrepresentation to be 
negligible, so obviously the false claim was not material to the Government’s decision.  The 
Supreme Court could use those facts as one end of the spectrum.  Contrast those facts with 
Campie, where Gilead directly violated the FDA agreements, changed ingredients and failed to 
disclose failed drug tests.  It is clear there that if the FDA had known of such serious violations; 
the Agency would have pulled the approval, therefore pulling the Government payment as well.  
With that spectrum of facts established it would give the lower courts a clear articulation on how 
to view misrepresentations made to secure payments and clear up the over-emphasis on 
continued payment.    
  Moreover, the Court could use Miller to emphasize how in certain instances bargained 
for contractual provisions could be highly relevant to materiality despite the fact that the 
Government continued to pay.  In Miller, it was clear how important the bargained-for 
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requirements for academic reporting’s were.  The Government made it exceedingly clear that it 
would rely on those reports in making its payment decisions.  While it is true that Justice Thomas 
stated these pre-conditions are merely “relevant and not dispositive” in some instances, the Court 
should remain true to the “natural tendency” test also articulated by Thomas.  If parties take such 
painstaking efforts to create contractual provisions, like in common-law, those provisions should 
hold some weight.  Further, when it is clear the Government is relying on them, so if the 
defendant has falsified those provisions then the Government would obviously pay.  Therefore, 
the Court can use Miller to illustrate how in some cases, the contractual provisions can hold 
weight beyond continued government payment.    
  When there are ambiguities among the circuits, it is vital for the Supreme Court to 
answer that ambiguity, and provide clarity.  Campie provides the platform for the Court to 
address the discrepancy head on.  The Supreme Court here can remain true to its standard created 
by Justice  
Thomas, and use Circuit cases to show the courts how to faithfully apply that balancing standard.    
  
    
    
  
  
  
  
